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Delegalization of Arms Control-A Democracy Deficit
in De Facto Treaties of Peace?
Antonio F. Perez*
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Delegalization of arms control is now an accomplished fact. In this period
of potential dramatic revision of the international order, it is not surprising that
the US is seeking increased flexibility in pursuing several strategies, including the
full use of military and technological advantages. The motivations behind this
include US interests, as well as long run global interests. What may be surprising,
however, is the potential risk to our democratic processes from delegalization of
arms control-that is to say, the danger posed by reduced use of arms control
treaties with built-in processes of transparency and democratic accountability.
The potential risk is particularly apparent in those cases where arms control
treaties function in effect as treaties of peace, alliance, or neutrality that arguably
should be subject to the control of the constitutional treaty makers.
Notwithstanding these concerns, this Article argues that on balance the
constitutional text, structure, and history compel the conclusion that the
democracy deficit risked by delegalization of arms control is adequately
attenuated through continuing congressional participation in the arms control
process and, in any event, outweighed by the need for a vigorous executive to
exercise the role it assumed at the very beginning of this Republic when "regime
change" in Europe was also the question of the day.
II. THE FACT OF DELEGALIZATION OF ARMS CONTROL: BOTH
MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL
The premise for this symposium, the trend toward delegalization of arms
control, now seems to be undeniable. Delegalization is often understood by
political scientists to be a complex phenomenon composed of normative
obligations, more or less precisely defined, with delegation of authority to
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neutral third parties for rule elaboration, interpretation, and enforcement.
Normative obligations invoke a compliance pull, and in those cases where
normative obligations are more precisely defined, claims of violated expectations
can be framed as breaches of those obligations. Delegation of fact-finding or
interpretive authority ensures transparency and publicity to multiply the
compliance pull of these normative obligations.' Yet even under this definition,
delegalization remains an amorphous concept. With respect to arms control,
delegalization of both multilateral and bilateral treaties may be implicated.
It seems clear that the US is less prepared to enter into multilateral arms
control treaties and evidences reduced commitment to existing regimes. The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was rejected by the Republican-controlled
Senate in 1999.2 The executive branch has walked away from negotiations to add
a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.3 After a spirited
domestic and international debate, the executive branch has also withdrawn the
United States from the ABM Treaty,4 which the Clinton administration had not
so long ago tried to transform into a multilateral obligation either through
interpretation or explicit amendment.5
In turn, Russia announced that it would no longer consider itself bound by
START 11.6 Diminished commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
I See generally Symposium on Legalizaion and World Politics, 54 Intl Org 385-683 (2000).
2 See Terry L. Deibel, The Death of Treaty, Foreign Aff 142 (Sept-Oct 2002).
3 See Kerry Boyd, US Attempts to Sink BWC Review Conference, Arms Control Today 27 (Oct
2002) (reporting US efforts to terminate negotiation of verification protocol to the Biological
Weapons Convention).
4 See Wade Boese, US Withdraws From ABM Treay," Global Response Muted, Arms Control Today
14-15 a uly-Aug 2002); Kucinich v Bush, 236 F Supp 2d 1 (D DC 2002) (rejecting challenge by
certain members of Congress to treaty termination on standing and political question
grounds).
Walter Dellinger, Constitutionalioy of Legislative Provision Regarding ABM Treaty: Memorandum for
the Counsel to the President (Office of Legal Counsel 1996), available online at <http://www.
usdoj.gov/olc/abmjq.wpd> (visited Feb 24, 2003) ("There are serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of a provision of a bill stating that the United States shall not be bound by
any international agreement entered into by the President that would substantively modify
the Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union, including any agreement that would
add other countries as signatories or convert that bilateral treaty into a multilateral treaty,
unless the agreement is entered pursuant to the President's treaty making power. The
provision intrudes on the Executive's exclusive constitutional powers to interpret and
execute treaties and to recognize foreign States.").
6 See Wade Boese, Russia Declared Itself No Longer Bound by START I, Arms Control Today 16
Ouly-Aug 2002). By announcing that it was no longer bound by the unratified START II,
Russia implicitly referenced its customary international law obligation to respect the object
and purpose of an unratified treaty. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, to which the US is not a party, but may well regard as evidence of customary
international law of treaties, requires a state not to "defeat the object and purpose" of a treaty
pending entry into force until "it has made clear its intention not to become a party" to that
treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969). See
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Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") is manifested in the lifting of nuclear sanctions and
acceptance of Pakistani and Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities.
7
However, US policy on the NPT should perhaps be interpreted in light of the
need to reforge an alliance with Pakistan as a frontline state in the war against
terrorism, rather than as a move toward diminished commitment to nuclear
nonproliferation.
The delegalization tendencies of the Bush administration seem to extend
not only to multilateral agreements, but to bilateral agreements as well. One
might have thought that the mutual gains in cooperative security with our new
Russian ally obtained through obligatory, precise, and fully transparent arms
control commitments-such as through a detailed new arms control
agreement-would not pose the same kinds of concerns as reliance on
multilateral institutions, which by definition are broader and more intrusive
upon national prerogatives. Nonetheless, a close review of the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty of May 24, 2002 ("SORT") shows that it too is an
example of delegalization, given its lack of precision and transparency.8 In what
appears to be a radical departure from previous arms control agreements, SORT
makes no serious effort to define in precise terms the obligations of the parties
for weapons reduction, focusing only on deployment; it also makes no effort to
develop procedures which would force the parties to produce information or
engage in normative debate about treaty compliance.
In effect, this lack of precision amounts to a decline in the level of
obligation far below what previous arms control negotiations have achieved.9
This decline in obligation occurs because of the relationship between precision
and obligation in the enforcement of arms control treaties. Obligation implies
that one is capable of identifying conduct that violates a treaty norm. Lack of
precision renders less credible any claim that a treaty norm has been violated,
because such a claim requires a much more complex chain of legal arguments
also Lori Fisler Damrosch, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 475-76 (West 4th ed
2001) (reporting US and Soviet disputes throughout the 1980s concerning their respective
compliance with the unratified SALT II arms control agreement and questioning whether
Article 18 is generally accepted as customary international law).
7 See Jim Hoagland, Nuclear Enabler; Pakistan Today Is the Most Dangerous Place on Earth, Wash
Post A35 (Oct 24, 2002).
8 See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, Arms Control Today 9 (June 2002).
9 See Wade Boese, Senate Reviews U.S.-Russian Nuclear Reductions Treaty, Arms Control Today 13
(Sept 2002) (reporting Secretary of State Colin Powell's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that "inspections and data exchanges of the 1991 START accord would
provide enough information on Russian activities, at least up to December 2009, when it
expires"). See also Peter Slevin, Ambitious Nuclear Arms Pact Faces a Senate Examination;
Minimal Details and Huge Warhead Cuts Embodj Bush Pofif, Wash Post A8 (July 7, 2002) ("Gone
are the covenants, caveats and vast appendixes typical of nuclear deals.").
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than would be required if the treaty text were lucid and precise.' ° Thus, the
reduced precision of SORT, as well as its lack of mechanisms for transparency
and normative discourse, provides compelling evidence for delegalization even
in the context of bilateral arms control agreements.
A. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ARMS CONTROL
DELEGALIZATION
Why arms control delegalization is taking root is, on some accounts, less
clear. A realist account of arms control delegalization would argue that the
United States should use its current relative power and supremacy to protect
national security in light of increased threats from weapons of mass destruction.
Realists understand that the ascendancy of any one nation is fleeting and
historically unique, and should be exploited while the opportunity remains
available. Multilateral institutions should only be resorted to when power is no
longer sufficient to achieve national objectives. This relative power could be
most effectively maximized either through nonlegal arrangements or, if
necessary, bilateral legal commitments in which US negotiating advantages
would be maximized. Alternatively, a so-called ideational or constructivist theory
might well focus on the role of evangelical Christianity's world-reforming vision
in the Bush administration's national security strategy." Finally, the decline in
obligation and precision of arms control agreements may also be better
understood in terms of a so-called second image or domestic politics explanation
of treaty legalization, focusing on the delegation dimension of legalization. Is
delegalization of arms control at the international level an executive branch
backlash against excessive legalization at the domestic level? That is, the
domestic politics explanation would consider the ABM Treaty controversy as
having resulted from an executive branch reaction to Congress' ratification
resolution of the chemical weapons conventon.'
2
Laurence Heifer identifies two key implementation strategies of the liberal
theory of international law, which recognizes the importance of domestic
politics: 1) incorporation of international law into domestic legal processes; and
10 See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Intl Org 379 (1996) (arguing that the appearance
of increased compliance often masks a regime design calculated to reduce the level of
obligation below the point where there is a risk of noncompliance).
I' See Michael Kelly, A Doctrne ofArmed Evangelism, Wash Post A31 (Oct 9, 2002).
12 For an example of backlash to overlegalization in another arena, compare Laurence R.
Helfer, Overlegaliging Human Rights: International Relations Theoy and the Commonwealth Caribbean
Backlash Against Human Rghts Regimes, 102 Colum L Rev 1832 (2002) (discussing backlash of
Caribbean states to supranational excessive legalization of human rights treaties when
supranational court issued death penalty judgment exceeding initial understanding of effect
of such treaties).
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2) supranational judicial review.13 Both of these strategies rely on judicialization
for delegation of treaty definition, elaboration, and enforcement functions. The
delegation function is defined as invoking neutral, third party review.14 But this
may be too narrow a definition. Delegation of these functions may well be made
to a nonneutral party or to a nonjudicial organ, such as the legislative branch. If
the legislative branch is incorporated into the process of treaty definition,
elaboration, and enforcement, its responsibilities will necessarily be carried out
through legislation. Such overlegalization has been identified by Helfer as the
source of a potential backlash response by the principals entering into the treaty.
Robert Putnam's central insight-that international negotiations are two-level
games in which negotiators are negotiating with external partners at one level
and simultaneously with domestic constituents at another levell--can be
extended to treaty implementation, breach and withdrawal questions. Thus, one
can understand arms control delegalization as the reduction of delegation to a
quasi-neutral, quasi-third party-that is, the legislative branch of the US
government.
In recent years, largely in response to the Clinton administration's decision
not to submit the WTO Agreement to the Senate as an Article II treaty,
commentators have debated whether in general Article II treaties and
congressional-executive agreements are constitutionally interchangeable. 6
Constitutional lawyers are really only beginning to focus on the delegation
dimension of this analysis. Even if Article II treaties and congressional-executive
international agreements are constitutionally interchangeable, they are certainly
distinguishable in terms of the degree of delegation they entail.
For delegations to the Senate,"7 the special supermajority requirement
applicable to Article II treaties receiving advice and consent to ratification is
comparable to the special supermajority requirement for constitutional
amendment processes. Moreover, the Senate's special role in giving advice and
13 Id at 1848, and more generally throughout.
14 See id at 1839, citing Kenneth W. Abbott, et al, The Concept of Legalization, 54 Intl Org 401
(2000).
15 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Intl Org
427 (1988).
16 Compare Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execuive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Poliy, 54 Yale L J 181 (1945) and Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv L Rev 801 (1995)
(agreeing with interchangeability, albeit as a modern practice contrary to original intent and
justified only through informal constitutional amendment), with Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv
L Rev 1221 (1995) (disagreeing with Ackerman's conclusions and methodology).
17 Note that for purposes of this Article, the Senate refers to the Senate acting under
supermajority voting rules in its capacity as an Article II treaty maker, while the Congress
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consent to treaty ratification does not exhaust the potential for delegation to the
Senate, given its continuing role in treaty oversight and amendment. 8 Indeed,
one-third of the Senate will be able to block future treaties if its views
concerning the implementation of prior treaties are ignored by the executive
branch.
Similarly, the Congress as a whole, through its appropriations power and
oversight responsibility, could also operate to some degree as a delegee of
responsibility for evaluating treaty compliance. 9 In the case of congressional-
executive agreements, a majority of both houses of Congress could block future
congressional-executive agreements when their views concerning the
implementation of prior congressional-executive agreements are ignored. Thus,
even if the Senate approval process functions as a more formidable check on
executive branch discretion, the potential role of the Congress as a whole should
not be ignored. Indeed, it is possible that where the Senate supermajority
requirement does not further democratic deliberation, but rather permits a
powerful minority faction to block critical national decisionmaking, bicameral
consideration of an issue via the congressional-executive agreement channel will
more effectively further deliberative democracy than would the Article II treaty
route.
Finally, the Senate or the Congress may still perform oversight and other
checking functions by normal political means, whether or not oversight is
explicitly delegated to them. For example, the Senate may link executive branch
ambassadorial nominees, or the Congress may link appropriations requests, to
executive branch implementation of a particular treaty or related treaty
obligations. These political means are available even in the case of sole executive
agreements, despite the fact that neither the Senate nor the Congress can claim a
right to influence the implementation of these agreements as they do not
participate in these agreements' initial authorization. This analysis brackets, of
course, the question of whether the Senate or the Congress is constitutionally
8 See generally David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment Not an Amendment?: Modification ofArms
Control Agreements Without the Senate, 59 U Chi L Rev 981 (1992); David A. Koplow,
Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U Pa L Rev
1353, 1366-75 (1989) (highlighting the role of the Senate in contesting the Reagan
administration's proposed "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty so as not to prohibit
development and testing of so-called "exotic" antiballistic missile systems).
19 See Angela M. Bradley, Opposing Interpretations of an International Treaty: The Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treat Controversy, 2 Chi J Intl L 295, 297 n 9 (2001), citing Charles Shotwell, Joginder Dhillon,
and Deborah C. Pollard, Ballistic Missile Defense for the Tweny-First Century: At the Crossroads of
Global Securi'y, Airpower (Special ed 1994) (reporting that "Congress continued to assert this
budgetary control through the Bush administration"). See generally Matthew D. McCubbins
and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28
Am J Polit Sci 165 (Feb 1984) (describing different kinds of congressional oversight as
strategies for optimizing the level of enforcement of legislative expectations).
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authorized to exercise its powers on the basis of conditions that are not germane
to the exercise of those powers.
In sum, with certain caveats and qualifications, the move from Article II
treaty, to congressional-executive agreement, to sole executive agreement,
evidences a move toward reduced domestic delegation and, correlatively,
reduced legalization of arms control policy for the United States.
B. DOMESTIC DELEGALIZATION AS A DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
One consequence of delegalization by means of reduced domestic
delegation is a possible decrease in transparency and accountability-in other
words, a potential democracy deficit in US arms control policy commitments.
One significant consequence could be a reduction in the public's commitment to
arms control agreements, which is in turn a critical factor in external perception
of the reliability of the nation's commitments. Perhaps more importantly, our
theory of government itself commands that the people bear ultimate
responsibility for the survival and success of the nation. This responsibility is
clearly implicated in US decisions concerning war and peace, as well as
armament and disarmament.
Briefly, decreased delegation imperils both the quantity and quality of the
democratic debate through which arms control agreements are legitimated. The
precise nature of this risk requires explanation, however, for it is by no means
self-evident that political transparency and accountability require that public
policy be discussed and debated in legal or quasi-legal terms. Compared to the
Congress, full-blown Senate advice and consent to an international agreement
does facilitate a deeper understanding of the precise nature of the commitment.
This is because, ceterisparibus, persuading a Senate supermajority, as opposed to a
simple Congressional majority, necessarily requires the production of additional
information, because the concerns of a greater number of views at the margins
must be addressed. The articulation of increased information and standards
related to the implementation of the treaty, moreover, is more likely to generate
commitments of a less transient nature. This is because layers of argument will
be added to the case for the treaty commitment, thus implicating values and
principles of a more permanent nature. As a whole, the Senate and its members
serve for longer periods, which individually and collectively enables them to
focus on the long-term effects of their policy choices. Debate over a treaty may
well function as a constitutive process for the political community, as obtaining
the support of a supermajority may well require a level of public justification that
compels the political community to develop an understanding of the treaty's role
in fashioning the commitments and interests of the nation. That understanding
may well take the form of a binding legal commitment in the treaty, either
express or implied through the cumulative effect of its particular provisions.
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Once the legal character of these commitments and value choices is
established, subsequent oversight may take a more principled form, facilitating
democratic debate that is structured, in part at least, in terms of the long-term
interests and values embedded in the prior decision to make a legal commitment.
In short, the argument for domestic delegation suggests that the Senate may play
a role parallel to the role played by the Supreme Court in ensuring that policy
implementation conforms to higher order, albeit nonconstitutional, values,
adopted as law by the supermajoritarian political process. Practically speaking,
the ability to frame issues of treaty compliance in legal terms will enable elite
decisionmakers who are skilled in legal discourse to communicate to the public
that treaties require more sustained consideration, as well as greater attention to
long-term implications, than do ordinary political questions. In other words, the
Senate's role can signal to the people that a question demands their full
attention.
The case for demanding the people's special attention for arms control
treaties is particularly strong. The process of shaping arms control policy may
well reinforce alliances or exacerbate adversarial relationships grounded in
ideology rather than interest. Reducing the domestic role in the oversight
process would reduce the level of transparency in national security policymaking
by diminishing the opportunity for Congress to request a reasoned justification
from the executive branch for how US policy comports with other countries'
understandings of US obligations. The likelihood, as well as the legal
justifiability, of other countries' adverse responses to US conduct will reveal
information about the nature and reliability of US treaty partners, the strength of
our international relationships, and the potential for conflict from a given course
of action. Indeed, even when US implementation of a treaty is itself merely a
question of discretion, the effect of US practice in shaping the meaning of the
treaty may have implications for claims that can later be made about the
compliance of other parties to a treaty. Reduction in the clarity and transparency
of public debate as to these issues may have correlative effects on political
accountability. Political actors may have less incentive to ask precise questions
about US policy when potential responses from the executive branch are more
likely to come in the form of subjective and unverifiable claims of national
interest, rather than relatively objective and determinable claims about US
compliance with international obligations. In sum, the benefit of legalization
through the partial domestic delegation of treaty implementation is that
increased transparency and democratic accountability will operate through a
more studied and refined domestic political process, yielding more democratic
and deliberative decisionmaking in this vital area.
This is not to say that only legalization can secure the benefits of full
democratic engagement on an issue. The political community surely has the
resources to engage in a debate about the wisdom of continued compliance with
Vol. 4 No. 1
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a treaty and, assuming that alternative courses of action are each treaty-
compliant, to determine how to exercise that pure policy discretion. In such
cases, the level of domestic legalization is not in tension with democratic
transparency and accountability. Alternatively, if the treaty in question were
completely lacking in precision, then the democratic gains to be derived from
domestic legalization would be trivial. For example, it is possible that the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification of SORT would yield no greater
transparency and accountability of executive branch decisionmaking than
congressional oversight of SORT implementation through the appropriations
power. Thus, a constitutional treaty, like SORT, could fail to specify US
commitments with sufficient precision, such that meaningful delegation to
Congress through continuing oversight could not take shape.
That said, whether a congressional role is an adequate substitute for a
constitutional treaty is, as a matter of US constitutional law, a separate question
from whether, from the domestic standpoint, the loss of transparency and
accountability due to delegalization of arms control can be sufficiently
attenuated. At the extreme point, even where there would be no democratic
gains from domestic legalization in terms of subsequent oversight, there would
still be democratic gains in terms of transparency and accountability for the
initial policy decision as to whether to enter into a treaty. At a minimum, then,
one might conclude that some level of congressional participation is required, as
a matter of constitutional law, for a US decision to enter into an arms control
agreement binding as a matter of international law. It is possible, moreover, that
an assessment of the constitutional text, structure, and history will compel the
conclusion that Senate advice and consent is required irrespective of the degree
of precision of the treaty in question. This Article now turns to that set of
questions.
III. EXECUTIVE ENERGY AND DISCRETION VERSUS POLITICAL
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
SENATORIAL PARTICIPATION: MUST THE SENATE BE
INVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL?
If we examine arms control delegalization through the prism of a
separation of powers analysis, then the critical question for US lawyers is
whether an executive branch decision to delegalize arms control agreements is
within executive powers or undercuts a constitutionally-mandated congressional
role. For purposes of this Article, however, the difficult question of whether
arms control domestic delegalization can proceed all the way to sole executive
agreements is deferred, although the force of the argument for executive branch
energy and discretion would seem to be applicable in that case as well, subject of
course to Congress' exercise of its own powers. Because the Senate and
Spring 2003
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Congress have taken conflicting positions on the application of the
interchangeability doctrine to arms control agreements, this Article will focus on
the narrow question of whether, assuming some congressional role is
constitutionally mandated, it is the exclusive prerogative of the Senate, or
whether it could be exercised by the Congress in the case of the SORT.
The Congress in enacting the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
specifically provided that arms control agreements may be concluded only
pursuant to Article II or congressional legislation, thus implying that, in some
circumstances at least, congressional-executive agreements are constitutional. °
Support for a congressional role, to the exclusion of the Senate, might be
grounded in Congress' authority to appropriate funds to "support Armies" but
not for "a longer Term than two Years."'" Admittedly, a similar temporal
limitation does not apply with respect to the Navy,22 thereby suggesting that
congressional involvement in management of the army may have been required
because of the special implications for democratic governance of a standing
army. Nonetheless, because of the foreign relations and national security
significance of any component of the military, Congress may still be able to rely
on the express provisions relating to the army to insist on participating in arms
control decisions. This is because, in the modern context, arms control decisions
bear on the creation of a garrison state, which the Framers sought to avoid
through the requirement of continuing congressional review of the standing
component of the US military.
On the other hand, the Senate, in giving its advice and consent to the
Agreement on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe,23 took the position that
international agreements that "reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments of
the United States in a militarily significant manner" can only be approved
20 See Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub L 105-277 § 303, 112 Stat 2861 (2002),
codified at 22 USC § 2573. For discussion, see Phillip R. Trimble and Jack M. Weiss, The Role
of the President, the Senate and Congress With Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United
States, 67 Chi Kent L Rev 645 (1991). See also Phillip R. Trimble and Alexander W. Koff, All
Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 Berkeley J Intl L 55, 59-60 (1998)
(albeit citing no pure arms control agreements, citing politico-military agreements, such as
those providing for the annexation of Texas and Hawaii and termination of World War I
after the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, as pertinent examples); Alan Axelrod, American
Treaties and Alliances 92 (Congressional Quarterly 2000) (summarizing the joint resolution of
Congress of July 2, 1921, authorizing President Harding to enter into the US-Germany
Treaty of Peace of August 25, 1921 and approving provisions of Treaty of Versailles other
than those found objectionable by the Senate).
21 US Const, art I, § 8, cl 12.
22 US Const, art I, § 8, cl 13.
23 See Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, reprinted in 30 ILM 6 (1991)
(hereinafter CFE Treaty).
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pursuant to the Article II treaty power.24 Given the conflict between the
Congress and the Senate, it seems prudent to evaluate whether the Senate's
position can be sustained. Such an evaluation should take place in the context of
the best possible case for demanding, as a constitutional matter, the level of
delegation that would accompany a mandatory Senate role as an Article II treaty
maker.
This Article considers the concrete case of SORT, because the executive
branch has taken the striking position that senatorial advice and consent to
ratification is not necessary or desirable. The executive branch has taken this
position largely because the SORT commitments entail weapons reductions
programs that the US already intends to implement as a matter of national
policy. Put another way, the executive branch contends that the larger shift in
the US-Russian relationship signaled by abandoning START II, coupled with
ABM Treaty withdrawal, does not require an additional policy judgment by the
Senate. The President, it turns out, has submitted SORT to the Senate (although,
as already noted, the transparency and accountability effects of this particular
agreement are quite modest), not because he felt obligated to do so based on
domestic constitutional law, but rather to fulfill a commitment to his Russian
negotiating partner, President Vladimir Putin, to employ the same legal form as
prior US-Russian arms control agreements.2" Arguably, because of the special
significance of START II, if the Bush administration is correct as a matter of
constitutional law that it was not required to submit SORT to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification, then surely it is also correct that any
democracy deficit caused by some degree of arms control delegalization in other
contexts is also within constitutional limits.
In brief, the case for required senatorial advice and consent to SORT
ratification can be grounded on constitutional text, structure, and history,
because of the need for Senate involvement in the policy shift that SORT
represents. There is, however, a nontrivial argument that the Senate has already
24 See Executive Session: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE], 102d Cong,
1st Sess (Nov 23, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec S 17845-46 (Nov 23, 1991). See also S Exec Rep
No 22 at 65, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991) (expressing intention of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to forward treaties to the Senate only on this basis).
25 One academic explanation of the use of the Article II pathway, rather than congressional-
executive agreements or sole presidential agreement pathways to treaty-making, is that the
greater difficulty of achieving an Article II treaty enhances the credibility of the commitment
thereby signaled, which turns out to be particularly important in the arms control setting. See
John K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treay's Preratification Pathway: Article II,
Congressional-Execulive, or Executive Agreement, 31 J Legal Stud S5, S27-28 (Jan 2002). It is not
clear, however, whether the SORT case supports this argument, because at the same time
that the President sought an Article I1 treaty, the substance of the commitment was
eviscerated. See Editorial, A New Nuclear Treaty, Wash Post A20 (May 14, 2002) (stating that
"critics argued ... that, though Mr. Bush had granted Mr. Putin the treaty he wanted, he had
stripped it of real substance").
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given its consent to the policy choices upon which SORT is predicated through
the conditions the Senate imposed in its resolution giving advice and consent to
ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ("CFE").26
If so, then without reaching the general question of whether an Article II treaty
is required for arms control agreements generally, one could still conclude that
the President was correct on the merits of whether advice and consent is
required for SORT. The broader rebuttal argument, however, sustaining the
President's constitutional position, is that arms control agreements like SORT by
their very nature seek to exploit the possibilities built into our Constitution for
executive energy and discretion. Such energy and discretion is precisely what is
needed in the kind of international environment the United States now faces. A
checking function requiring concurrence of a supermajority of the Senate would
instead paralyze the President and undercut his ability to exercise the full
executive power the Constitution has granted him.
A. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF MODERN ARMS CONTROL AND
SENATORIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION TO
RATIFY SORT
In framing the issue of the Senate's right to participate in the decision to
ratify SORT, one might first ask whether the Senate was involved in ratifying a
Treaty of Peace ending the Cold War. A former National Security Council staff
member and law professor has called the Four-Power Agreement reunifying
Germany in effect a Treaty of Peace between the US and Russia.21 If so, surely
the arms control arrangements related to the Cold War settlement, such as
START I, START II, and now SORT, are in pai materia with that Treaty of
Peace. It is an open question whether treaties of peace must be submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. James Madison, writing as
Helvidius in opposition to President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in
respect to the French Revolutionary wars, maintained that the power to
conclude peace could not reside in the executive alone.28 Woodrow Wilson
seemed to subscribe to this position in seeking congressional approval to end
World War I by treaty after the failure of the Senate to accept the Versailles
26 See note 24.
27 See generally Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of History, ch 23
(Knopf 2002) (treating the Treaty of Paris formally ending four-power occupation of
Germany and consenting to German reunification as a treaty of peace-ending, not World
War 11, but rather the long Cold War between the US and USSR-and having international
'constitutional" significance).
28 See James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, It 1, § 2, reprinted in The Letters of Padficus and Helvidius
(1845) With the Letters ofAmeicans (Scholars' Facsimiles 1976). See generally Louis G. Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution 385 n 48 (Oxford 2d ed 1996).
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Treaty,29 although Supreme Court dictum has suggested otherwise.3" That said, if
the Treaty of Peace ending the Cold War was submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent, then any subsequent arms control arrangements modifying
the Treaty of Peace arguably should be returned to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
31
If the Senate must be involved in the decision whether to terminate war
and establish peace, then the right historical analogy might well be President
Monroe's agreement with Great Britain for the partial demilitarization of the
Great Lakes and Lake Champlain (the "Rush-Bagot Agreement"). The Rush-
Bagot Agreement was the equivalent of an arms control agreement in its day,
and a logical extension of the Treaty of Peace settling the War of 1812 with
Great Britain. Although initially concluded as an executive agreement, the Rush-
Bagot Agreement was submitted a year later to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification.32
Admittedly, some argue that the precedent is ambiguous, suggesting that
submission to the Senate ex abuntante cautela does not undercut the effect of
Madison's initial decision not to submit the treaty to the Senate prior to its entry
into force.33 Indeed, it may have been that President Monroe's subsequent
29 See Axelrod, American Treaties and Alliances at 92 (cited in note 20). See generally Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution at 395 n 48 (cited in note 28), citing Clinton Rossiter, The
Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief 79 & n 23 (Cornell 1951).
30 See Ludecke v Watkins, 335 US 160, 168 (1948) ("'The state of war' may be terminated by
treaty or legislation or presidential proclamation.").
31 But see Memorandum of Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to
the National Security Council, Validiy of Congressional-Executive Agreements That Substantial y
Modify the United States Obligations Under an Existing Treaty 1, Opinions of the Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice (Nov 25, 1996), available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/treaty.top.wpd> (visited Feb 24, 2003) (concluding that "[i]t lies within Congress' power
to authorize the President substantially to modify the United States' domestic and
international legal obligations under a prior treaty, including an arms control treaty, by
making an executive agreement with our treaty partners, without Senate advice and
consent"). Even though the Schroeder Memo makes broad claims for a Congressional Treaty
Power, it acknowledges that Congress has only "some" power in this area, id at 8-9, and that
this power is arguably greatest only when exercised incidentally to another enumerated
power, such as the War Power, id at 8 n 17.
Of course, one can draw the logical inference that the war power itself operates as authority
for a congressional role, indeed perhaps even to the exclusion of the Senate and perhaps sole
presidential agreements, in all arms control treaties. This argument would be premised on the
ground that all questions of force posture could well conduce to war or peace. This broad-
ranging argument concerning the nature and constitutional allocation of the war power must
be set aside, given the narrower purposes of this Article.
32 See Sharon G. Hyman, Executive Agreements: Beond Constitutional Limits?, 11 Hofstra L Rev
805, 805 n 5 (1983).
33 See id at 805 n 5, citing Act of Feb 27, 1815, ch 62, 3 Stat 217 (noting that "Rush-Bagot may
have actually been a congressional-executive agreement [despite the later ratification] since
Congress had earlier authorized the President to sell or lay up all the armed vessels on the
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decision to submit the treaty to the Senate was connected to the fact that the
British Minister actually asked Secretary of State John Quincy Adams whether
the President would do so. 4 Notwithstanding the President's initial answer that
he did not feel required to do so, assuaging British concerns about the validity of
the US commitment may have motivated the President to seek the Senate's
advice and consent as a matter of political reinsurance. If so, some might argue
that early practice with respect to the Rush-Bagot Agreement is precedent for
the executive branch's current position that it was not constitutionally required
to submit SORT to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, and that its
decision to do so reflects a political judgment of the desirability of assuaging
Russian concerns rather than evidence of a constitutional requirement.
Nonetheless, the fact that upon reflection the President did request
senatorial participation is arguably attributable to his recognition that, like the
settlement of the Cold War, Rush-Bagot had important implications for US
force structure and force deployments. It embodied the military consequences of
the political settlement of the war with Great Britain, which, like the Cold War,
was in effect a forty-year war, dating back to Concord and Lexington. 35 Peace
with Great Britain enabled a major revision of US military and diplomatic
strategy. Securing the northern border of the United States allowed her to
redirect her energy toward the south and the west. Indeed, premised on this
modus vivendi, the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine a few years later
represented a strategic alliance between the US and Great Britain to ensure the
liberation of Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonial possessions in the New
World. This strategic cooperation in facilitating regime change in the New
World in the first third of the 19th century represented a policy shift of
enormous magnitude, with implications for security, trade, and culture that went
far beyond the direct budgetary impact of Great Lakes demilitarization. It is hard
to imagine US territorial expansion to the Pacific through the Mexican-American
War without the implicit US-UK condominium in the Western Hemisphere.
Indeed, the new strategic equation may have influenced US understanding of its
international legal obligations as a relatively new member of the community of
Great Lakes"); Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations Law and National
Security Law. Cases, Materials and Simulations 281 (West 2d ed 1993), citing Wallace McClure,
International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under the Constitution of the United States 38
(Columbia 1941).
34 See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaoy Power, 77 NC L Rev 133, 176
(1998); Andrew T. Hyman, The Unconstitutionalit of Long-Term Nuclear Pacts That Are Rejected by
Over One-Third of the Senate, 23 Denv J Ind L & Poly 313, 336-37 & n 101 (1995).
35 See Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quingy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Poliy 231
(Knopf 1949) (noting that the US and UK agreed to secure the peace by allowing the US to
hold Canada "hostage" for US coastal cities, which remained for some time at the mercy of
the British Navy). Like the ABM Treaty, then, Rush-Bagot established peace between the US
and UK through their mutual assured vulnerability.
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states. For example, one should view Secretary of State Daniel Webster's
articulation of the so-called Caroline test for preemptive self-defense in the
context of demilitarization of the Great Lakes.36 This is because the narrowness
of Webster's test for preemptive action may have been predicated on the
strategic reality that neither British nor American force deployments in that
Niagara River theater of operations presented any genuine risk to the security of
either state.
1. SORT Submission as Fulfillment of the Requirement for a New
Senatorial Policy Choice
On this line of reasoning, START I and II represent the military
component of the implicit Treaty of Peace between the US and former Soviet
Union ending the Cold War. One of the early manifestations of that treaty is
Russian acquiescence in US force deployments in the southern former Soviet
republics and US and Russian cooperation in the military campaign in
Afghanistan itself. Even if never ratified by Russia because of the continuing
controversy concerning the ABM Treaty, senatorial advice and consent to
START II ratification defined the terms under which the US determined the
force posture consistent with settlement of the Cold War. Congress continued to
hold a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, precluding the kind of
development and testing sought by the Reagan and Bush administrations. This
resistance arguably signified Congress' continued commitment to the compact
embedded in arms control regimes since the ABM Treaty was concluded: only
limited missile defense as an inducement to offensive reductions. Conclusion of
SORT in an environment in which President Bush had effected the withdrawal
of the United States from the ABM Treaty signaled a revolution in arms control
policy. If this line of reasoning is sustainable, the Senate should now be able to
approve or disapprove any shift from the policy adopted under START by the
same two-thirds vote it enjoyed in the context of its prior ratification of US arms
control policy.
2. The Senate's CFE Resolution of Ratification as a New Policy
Choice Obviating Submission of SORT to the Senate
Arguably, however, the senatorial understanding underlying the ABM-
START bargain was revoked by the Senate's resolution of ratification of the
36 Damrosch, et al, InternalionalLaw: Cases andMaterials at 922-23 (cited in note 6), quotingJohn
Moore, 2 Digest of International Law 412 (1906) (responding to the British claim that the
sinking of a US vessel, the Caroline, within US territory was justified as lawful self-
preservation and self-defense, Webster asserted that the use of self-defense should be
confined to situations in which a government can show that the "necessity of that self-
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CFE Treaty in 1997. In that resolution, the Senate insisted that any changes to
the ABM Treaty needed to be submitted to it for its advice and consent to
ratification. The Senate asserted its right to determine whether or not to expand
the ABM Treaty to include some of the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union-and perhaps more significantly, to confirm the continued
viability of the ABM Treaty with respect to the Russian Federation as sole
successor of the former Soviet Union.37 At a minimum, the Senate's resolution
cast doubt on the continued status of the ABM Treaty as an international
obligation of the United States prior to President Bush's invocation of the
extraordinary circumstances withdrawal clause. At a maximum, once the
President's brought the CFE Treaty into force in accordance with the Senate's
resolution, the executive branch arguably acquiesced in the view that the ABM
Treaty no longer bound the United States. In any event, President Bush's
decision to invoke the extraordinary circumstances withdrawal clause of the
ABM Treaty now has sealed the fate of the former Cold War policy of linking
offensive reductions to a commitment not to develop defensive capabilities.
Arguably, one should not attach too much weight to this argument. It may
be questioned whether the condition was a constitutionally permissible exercise
of senatorial discretion.38 The Senate's claim of authority might rely on the
premise of a required senatorial role in treaty interpretation and treaty
termination. The interpretive question was whether, as a matter of international
law, succession to the bilateral ABM Treaty could take the form of a multilateral
arrangement without requiring a new expression of an intention to be bound by
each of the treaty parties. This novel question of treaty interpretation and the
operation of the law of treaties was not a question requiring a new policy
judgment by the Senate if the President were to conclude, as a matter of
international law, that no new intention to be bound was required. A senatorial
role, on this assumption, would then need to be predicated on a treaty law
interpretation power that would be exercised in conflict with the President's own
interpretation. Even if it ever existed, such a power now seems quite doubtful
except in the most extraordinary cases.39 If, then, the Senate's conduct were
37 See The Arms Control Reporter 407B.56 (1997). See also Flank Document Agreement to the
CFE Treaty, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (May 14, 1997), in 143 Cong Rec S 4451, 4452-53 (May
14, 1997) (statement of Senator Biden, criticizing some provisions of the Flank Document as
unconstitutional).
38 See generally Trimble and Koff, 16 Berkeley J Ind L 55 (cited in note 20) (analyzing whether
such a condition is a constitutionally permissible limitation on executive discretion).
39 Compare, for example, Treaty of 1832 between the United States and Russia, S 161, 62d
Cong, 2nd Sess (Dec 18, 1911), in 48 Cong Rec 453 (Jan 17, 1912), with Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 339, cmt a (1987) (expressing modern
position based on sustained practice including sole presidential withdrawal in a number of
cases, but suggesting constitutional limits to the exercise of this power, including the case
where withdrawal "might create serious danger of war").
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grounded on a power to interpret treaties, the condition imposed by the Senate
in the CFE Treaty arguably would be of questionable constitutionality.
That said, the Senate's condition in the CFE resolution of ratification quite
sensibly could have relied, not on the Senate's own competence to interpret a
treaty, but rather on the executive branch's own interpretation of the status of
the ABM Treaty. This is because, when the executive branch stated its own view
that new agreements with the successor states of the former Soviet Union were
required in order for them to be bound by the ABM Treaty, it implicitly
conceded the dissolution of the ABM Treaty. Thus, the Senate's condition was
not necessarily predicated on its own interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but
rather on the President's interpretation and the consequences of that
interpretation as a matter of US constitutional law. Under this view, the Senate
was authorized, indeed obligated in the exercise of its own powers, to seek to
constrain the executive branch from entering into international obligations for
which, under the executive's own view of the applicable international law, it had
no constitutional authority to bind the United States. The executive's view was,
no doubt, grounded on a range of technical and diplomatic considerations
involving nuclear nonproliferation and arms control policy with respect to the
former Soviet Union. It is doubtful that, in a fast-changing international
environment, these factors would have been calculable except by an organ, such
as a unitary executive, capable of conceptualizing and implementing complex
negotiating strategies over time.
If the Senate's claim had been predicated on the executive's own
interpretation of the status of the ABM Treaty, this approach would reflect the
Senate's awareness of the limits on its role in foreign affairs questions requiring
the exercise of presidential discretion. Applied to the particular case of SORT,
let us assume for the sake of argument that the President concluded that any US
obligations under SORT were in effect already established under existing US
arms control commitments. If the Senate believed that deference to executive
branch interpretation of international law was required in the CFE case and
acted accordingly, then under its own precedent it should have to defer to the
President's judgment that SORT did not require the Senate's advice and consent.
B. EXECUTIVE ENERGY AND DISCRETION
The constitutional sources supply overwhelming evidence that, in times of
international crisis, it is only the President who can exercise what John Locke
called the "federative" power.4' This power, when combined with the executive
function, has in our constitutional tradition yielded a healthy deference by other
40 See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law: United States Foreign Relations Law 15-18 (Foundation
Press 2002) citingJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 150 (Gateway ed 1955).
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constitutional organs to executive discretion.4' In the famous debate between
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison concerning Washington's Neutrality
Proclamation 42 (as proxies for George Washington and Thomas Jefferson,
respectively), it seems well settled that Pacificus won the day43 in light of
Jefferson's and Madison's own practices when each in turn became President.
Washington's authority as Commander-in-Chief to avoid war carried within it
the seeds of presidential authority to take steps that risked war. Jefferson used
the federative power to justify intervention against the Barbary Pirates, and also
the purchase of the Louisiana Territory, which extended the US border and
thereby increased the risk of foreign conflict. These examples suggest that the
risks flowing from the vigorous exercise of the federative power cannot be
separated from the benefits that would justify such action by the President.
Thus, Washington's Neutrality Proclamation is evidence, not for a
presumption of presidential passivity, but rather for the exercise of presidential
discretion in a fast-changing international environment. The convoluted course
of the French Revolution had, by 1793, turned in the direction of external
subversion and regime change, drawing Europe into two camps over the future
of monarchical government. Washington's Proclamation sought to separate the
US from this titanic struggle, not because the US should be isolationist as a
matter of principle, but rather because an external policy of neutrality was the
policy best calculated to ensure the security of the fledgling United States and
the survival of its new form of government. There seems to be no doubt this is
the role the constitutional plan envisaged for the President, because the office
was designed with someone of Washington's capacities in mind.
This view of the President's constitutional role was confirmed by the
Destroyers for Bases Deal, whereby President Franklin Roosevelt used his
presidential power to strengthen the US's ally, the British, during World War II.
He thereby made war with the German Reich almost unavoidable, further
limiting whatever may been left of the Congress' exclusive prerogative to declare
war under the Constitution.4 4 Indeed, in these circumstances Washington may
well have concluded, as Roosevelt did in 1940, that the nation's security and the
survival of its form of government required regime change in Germany. If so, it
was necessary that the President be granted discretion as Commander-in-Chief
41 See generally id at 15-18.
42 See Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus, It 1, reprinted in Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius
(cited in note 28).
43 See Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law at 280-81 (cited in note
33), quoting from Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 73 (H. Syrett ed
1969).
4 See Robert H. Jackson, Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39
Op Atty Gen 484 (Aug 27, 1940) (relying on the Commander-in-Chief power and "the
control of foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the President as a part of the
Executive function").
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to forward deploy US forces pursuant to the Destroyers for Bases deal,
notwithstanding the increased risk of conflict with Germany-just as he would
have had the discretion to choose the path of neutrality if he had concluded
again that neutrality was the best course. Deference to presidential energy and
discretion cannot operate only as a ratchet toward accepting the risks of too
peaceful a strategy, thereby failing to accept the risks of too aggressive a strategy.
In principle, either neutrality or belligerency may produce decreased national
security. The President's judgment regarding these prudential questions depends
on a difficult and complex assessment of domestic and international
circumstances. Short of some obvious abuse of power-for example, if the
President used external conflict in order to justify the suppression of the civil
liberties of Americans at home4 -- the discretion accorded the President cannot
turn on the direction in which he exercises that discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for executive branch energy and discretion was at the root of the
creation of a unitary presidency. It has survived the impeachment trials of
Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton, as well as Richard Nixon's resignation, and
throughout the Cold War enabled the executive branch to exercise the energy
and discretion necessary to preserve the American way of life.46 In the current
crisis facing the United States, the executive branch needs the capacity to
negotiate and enforce both bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements
with rogue states possessing chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological
weapons capabilities. To require subsequent approval from a supermajority of
the Senate, or even a simple majority of both Houses of Congress, could cripple
the President's capacity to advance the US agenda. But advance consent would
require a delegation of authority so broad that congressional oversight would
essentially be removed from the legalization process. Indeed, it could even
undermine crucial cooperation between the executive and legislative branches by
generating false expectations, misunderstandings, and mistrust. There could be
cases where secrecy-so essential to national policymaking in the arms control
context-would be compromised through excessively transparent
decisionmaking, a risk the Framers understood and attempted to address in the
45 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sanyer, 343 US 579 (1952) (holding that neither the
President's Article 1I powers nor his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
justifies seizure of private businesses to settle labor disputes, even when the business is
arguably vital to national defense).
4 But see Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expedieny and Executive Agreements,
86 Cal L Rev 671 (1998) (advancing a critical view of executive authority during this period
and arguing for a decline in executive authority during the post-Cold War era).
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constitutional design.47 In short, meaningful delegation and legalization can be
purchased only at the price of efficacy.
Of course, as the Court wrote with respect to the power to abridge private
contractual rights in the face of the Great Depression: "Emergency does not
create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or ... diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted."48 But emergency does call for
constitutional comity, so that the branches of our government authorized to
perform functions for the sake of the nation are not restrained from doing so by
a coordinate political branch's refusal to exercise restraint in the application of
its own powers. We may need to accept a return to the more vigorous executive
branch exercise of the foreign affairs powers originally envisioned under our
Constitution, after a false and brief sunlight of increased transparency and
accountability in foreign policy decisionmaking at the end of the Cold War. But
we can still rejoice in the fact that, even if the Senate under Article II and the
Congress under Article I play diminished roles in foreign policymaking, Article
III courts will continue to ensure that presidential power abroad is not turned
against legitimate dissent at home.
47 See Federalist 64 (Jay), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist Papers 432, 434-35 (Wesleyan
1961) (observing that the need for secrecy and dispatch were accounted for in the framing of
the Constitution).
4 See Home Bldg & Loan Assn v Blaisdell, 290 US 398, 425 (1934).
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